ブックタイトル佐藤栄作　受賞論文集

概要

佐藤栄作　受賞論文集

Therefore, North Korea chose to make a motion that led to negotiation with the USto stop North Korea's nuclear development in exchange for aid from the US. Both ofthem agreed on the framework in which North Korea was to forsake nuclear ambitionon 21 st October 1994. 14 At the same time, the US, Japan and South Korea increasedtheir cooperation in the area of security. Victor Cha and David Kang mentioned that“For the U.S.-Japan-Korea relationship, this means deliberate efforts at maturing thealliance beyond its narrow anti-DPRK rationale to encompass a border definition.”15It demonstrates the US with its allies Japan and South Korea restrains the expansionof North Korea. This caused led North Korea to become an isolated country.Ironically, the isolation of North Korea meant that there is no way to be secure inNorth Korea except for with armament, and the development of a nuclear program.David Kang shows that“North Korea's nuclear weapons, missile programs andmassive conventional military developments are aimed at deterrence and defence.”16Furthermore he argues that "Even if the North develops nuclear weapons, it will notuse them because of a devastating U.S. response, the North wants a guarantee ofsecurity from the U.S." 17 Finally, the agreement between the US and North Korea didnot work when North Korea refused to meet the IAEA and left the NPT. This ledto North Korea's announcement to maintain a the nuclear weapon on 10 thFebruary2005. 18 Subsequently, created the negotiation party to halt the nuclear regime inNorth Korea between six countries: the US, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Russiaand China. However, North Korea had nuclear weapon test on 9 th October in 2006. 19This action led the UNSC Resolution 1718 on 14 th October 2006. 20 That was a quick80414 C. Kenneth Quinones‘Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO): A Bridge Too Far?' in Seung-HoJooandTae-HwanKwaked.,NorthKorea'sSecondNuclearCrisisandNortheastAsianSecurity,p.16915 Victor Cha and David Kang‘Beyond Hyperbole, Toward A Strategy' in Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang ed.,Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003) p.17416 David Kang‘Threatening, But Deterrence Works' in Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang ed., Nuclear North Korea, p.4317Ibid,p.4318 Tae-Hwan Kwak‘North Korea's Second Nuclear Crisis and the Six-Party Talks' in Seung-Ho Joo and Tae-HwanKwak ed., North Korea's Second Nuclear Crisis and Northeast Asian Security, (Hampshire: Ashgate PublishingLimited, 2007) p.1519Ibid,p.1520 Jeremy Paltiel‘China and the North Korea Crisis: The Diplomacy of Great Power Transition' in Seung-Ho Jooand Tae-Hwan Kwak ed., North Korea's Second Nuclear Crisis and Northeast Asian Security, (Hampshire: AshgatePublishing Limited, 2007) p.106