ブックタイトル佐藤栄作論文集９～１６

概要

佐藤栄作論文集９～１６

第16回佳作It has been suggested by those in the realist camp that negotiations serve noreal purpose and are simply an engagement of politics used to carry out the policyobjectives of each side. In the case of Kosovo it has been suggested that the wordingof the initial peace plan of March 23 presented at Rambouillet by the NATO alliancesto Yugoslavia, was designed so as to guarantee rejection. Under the plan, NATO wasto“constitute and lead a military force…that NATO will establish and deploy -- inand around Kosovo…operating under the authority and subject to the direction andpolitical control through the NATO chain of command.”6 It is hard to find any countrythroughout history, outside of unconditional surrender, that has agreed to suchstringent demands.Similarly with the May 5 1999 agreement between the UN, Indonesia and Portugaloutlining the conditions over East Timor’s ballot for self-determination, the securitymandate was given to Indonesia -- one of the parties to the conflict. It is widelyconceded that the situation in East Timor escalated out of control at the failure of theIndonesian security forces to keep the peace and abide by its agreement. In hindsightthere is little evidence to suggest that the Indonesian Military ever had any intentionof upholding the Agreement.It follows that the participants to negotiations are an important variable in theprocess. In the case of Kosovo participants to the process were restricted to leadersof one party and an external representative of the other. There was no representationof the ethnic Albanian community living in Kosovo. It is likely that these memberswould have a greater understanding and respect for the Serbian culture, religion andhistory and would take such considerations into a mediation process. At the sametime it is likely that Milosevic would feel less threatened and more at ease to anAlbanian -- as opposed to US -- party to negotiation.6 Noam Chomsky, Kosovo Peace Accord, Z Magazine, July 1999, p. 4.887