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佐藤栄作論文集9~16

第14回最優秀賞being a‘latecomer’and of‘catching up’similarly are more likely to imbue a sense offollowership than leadership. Japan’s experiment - under a destructive military clique- to forge a hegemonic leadership role in the Asia-Pacific region resulted in disaster inthe 1930s and 1940s, and this further underpinned a sense of circumspection, pacifismand passivity in foreign relations.The post-war reversal in policy allowed Japan to concentrate on developmentunder the umbrella of American security and export access. In the Cold War context,American tolerance of Japan’s protectionist and isolationist tendencies thus removedthe necessity for active engagement with the world. The American occupation andthe creation - or imposition - of the Peace Constitution contributed to restricting themilitary aspect of‘hard power’. The occupation also helped to consolidate a politicalsystem which hindered forthright political leadership in the context of a balance ofentrenched interest groups. Japan had become deeply wary of foreign entanglementsand was able to embark upon a state-guided industrialization program with a ratheropportunistic and narrow attitude towards the world. International politics wassomething to respond to when pressure ? gaiatsu - necessitated; foreign policy by riskminimization and‘coping’. 6Externally, Japan’s history likewise casts a shadow. In Asia particularly thememory of Japan’s activities in the 1930s and 1940s - and, according to some, itsfailure to satisfactorily atone for its misdemeanors - imposes limitations upon Japan’sregional leadership. 7Despite the contact that has accompanied global trade andinvestment penetration, these earlier historical experiences have left their mark.Within Japan, insular and inward-looking traits are still strong; there is a reluctance tobe involved in potentially messy overseas entanglements and a wariness of allowingtoo much power to the military after it led the country into disaster in the 1930s and6 Michael Blaker,‘Japan’s Diplomatic Style: Evaluating Japanese Diplomatic Performance’, in Gerald Curtis ed., Japan’sForeign Policy After the Cold War. Coping With Change, New York, M. E. Sharpe Inc., 1993.7 See, for example, Hyung Kook Kim,‘Japan, Korea, and Northeast Asia: A Korean View’, in Warren S. Hunsbergered., Japan’s Quest: The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1997; LeePoh-Ping,‘Japan and the Asia-Pacific Region: A Southeast Asian Perspective’, in Craig C. Garby and Mary BrownBullock ed., Japan: A New Kind of Superpower? Washington DC, The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994.529