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佐藤栄作 受賞論文集

incomplete. 17Unfortunately, the logic of humanitarian intervention, which contrastsindividual rights against collective rights, is misleading. 18The struggle for humanrights, symbolized by humanitarian interventions, is turned into a struggle againststate sovereignty; however, the two are not synonymous. To date, most humanitarianinterventions and operations carried out by the UN or its powerful members inpursuit of“humanitarian”goals have been truly“inhumane”in their means. This isexemplified in many cases such as the enforcement of“No Fly Zones”in Kurdishpopulatedareas in Iraq (1991); the Kosovo campaign (1999) with its victimizedpeaceful population of both Serbs and Muslims; the operation in Afghanistan (2001),and others. 19 According to a recent leak of UN estimates, the expected second Iraqicampaign would kill or seriously wound an estimated 500,000, most of them innocent,Iraqis.Lund suggests that the“...one-size-fits-all mentality often also ignores the balanceof power and other crucial features of given local conflict situations”. 20 This can justas easily be said of humanitarian interventions. The danger of interventions is thatthey are frequently driven by“a sort of crisis industry -- so that they can do no otherthan to pursue the most costly and difficult military interventions and to heroicallydistribute humanitarian aid, but in-between such crises, they bypass the opportunitiesfor more timely peaceful preventive engagements into unstable situations thatpresent fewer difficulties, controversy and costs”. 21Above all, most interventions up19017 For an extensive view of this type of argument and to prove this point, see ibid. As Maley suggests,“Militaryinterventions may sometimes be the only way to put an end to unspeakable barbarisms and, in some cases (mostrecently the INTERFET and UNTAET operations in East Timor), has had promising outcomes, but it is a bluntinstrument for the rectification of problems rooted in dysfunctional political, economic and social structures andcultures”. Also, ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background, Ottawa: InternationalDevelopmentResearchCentre,2001,p.372.18 For this type of argument, see Edward S. Herman, preface, in David Chandler ed., From Kosovo to Kabul: HumanRights and International Intervention, London: Pluto Press, 2002, pp. x-xi. Also, Kofi Annan, The Question ofintervention,NewYork:TheUnitedNations,1999,pp.37-47.19 As Chandler contends, the UN and Western powers are faced with the“Guernica Paradox”when they do not know“when it can be right to unleash a terror on terrorists, to bomb for human rights, to kill to stop crimes againsthumanity?”See, Chandler, op. cit., pp. 184-185, Michael Lund and Guenola Rasamoelina eds., The impact of ConflictPrevention Policy: Cases, Measures, Assessments, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000, p. 13.20 Ibid.21 Ibid., p. 14.