ブックタイトル佐藤栄作論文集９～１６

概要

佐藤栄作論文集９～１６

If the leaders and representatives of the peoples of East Timor had been includedin mediation then it is unlikely, in light of history, that they would have agreed toan Indonesian security mandate. The failure of Indonesia to abide by the May 5UN Agreement is hardly surprising. We only have to look to UN Security Councilresolutions 384（1975）and 389（1976）calling on Indonesia to withdraw from EastTimor without delay, and the eight resolutions of the General Assembly on EastTimor. More recently the April 21, 1999 Peace Pact brokered by General Wirantohas been held in disrepute as paramilitary violence persisted with Indonesia makingseemingly little effort to control it. Prior to the May 5 UN Agreement there wasstrong evidence of Indonesian Military involvement in the arming of pro-autonomymilitia. In the town of Maubisse, for example, observers witnessed the Indonesianriot police（BRIMOB）distributing automatic weapons to militia members travellingto a pro-autonomy rally. It would be very unlikely that representative of the EastTimorese would have agreed to an Indonesian security mandate.The second justification for the UN to change its core function to one of mediationis do with its image. Whether or not it chooses to concede it, the UN has an imageproblem. For many states, both small and large, east and west, the activities of theUN, whether well intentioned or not, are perceived as imperial expansion of westernpower. The UN’s image as a representation of western interests is an obstacle toresolving the dilemma of ethnic conflicts. Ethnicity has been used as the trump cardfor respecting the sovereignty of the state and discarding grounds for humanitarianintervention. The differing value on human rights between and within states is aprime example of the sticky mandate based on balancing ethnicity and sovereignty ofthe state.Although it is argued that the forces of globalization have brought cultures together888