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佐藤栄作論文集9~16

第12回佳作in organizational change the“Balanced Scorecard”19and lastly in the implementationof international trade policies of the WTO, the“Trade Policy Review Mechanism.”20For simplicity sake, let us call this non-coercive process that has the potential to affectindividual, organizational or national behavior a“conditioning mechanism.”This is how the conditioning mechanism works. First through a process ofnegotiation a vision of optimal individual, organizational or international“adjustment”islaid out in a fairly simple outline form. By establishing basic parameters of importantissues these outline forms facilitate interaction and exchange; contributing the basisfrom which to later assess and monitor individual efforts. Once the parameters arelaid out and agreed upon by the parties they can be used evaluate progress and serveas a means for the parties to continually up-date their own strategies.In individual therapy both the therapist and client will assess progress according tothese measures. Likewise in the(WTO)both the member nation and the Secretariatwill assess progress according to the given parameters. Two separate reviews willfollow; one is an evaluation by the individual party of its own progress, the other iswritten up by the Secretariat. Discussion will then follow on how the party underreview is progressing. Input from other members may follow. Over time this“noncoercive”process has the potential to go beyond helping parties better recognizerealties and gain perspective on how to help themselves. At its best, the process canhelp play an important institutional role in influencing decisions and actions that leadto desirable outcomes. Over time the party may begin to think in terms of the definedparameters and act beforehand to better their own adjustment in those specifiedareas. This is preventive diplomacy at its best.19 See“The Balanced Scorecard-Measures That Drive Performance,”by Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton in theHarvard Business Review, January-February 1992. See also“Putting the Balanced Scorecard to Work”by the sameauthors in the Harvard Business Review, September-October 1993.20 The Trade Policy Review Mechanism(TPRM), established first on a trial basis in April 1989 during the mid-termresults of the Uruguay Round, was born from one of the Uruguay Round’s negotiating groups commonly referredto as FOGS(functioning of the GATT system). The negotiating group wished to strengthen GATT's abilityto adapt to present and future developments in the international economics environment. The FOGS group, inlooking towards strengthening GATT’s institutional powers, empowered GATT with the TPRM; a mechanism thatarguable made it a“wiser”institution or at least gave GATT the potential to enhance its functioning.381